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COMMENTARY 
THE YmTUOUS PROSECUTOR IN QUEST 
OF AN ETIDCAL STANDARD: 
GUIDANCE FROM THE ABA 
H. Richard Uviller* 
AMONG his other endeavors, the public prosecutor strives to main-tain an upright stance in the stained halls of criminal justice. 
He correctly senses that the people demand more of him than dili-
gent, workmanlike performance of his public chores. Virtue is the 
cherished ingredient in his role: the honorable exercise of the con-
siderable discretionary power with which our legal system has en-
dowed his office. Daily, the ethical fibre of the prosecutor is tested 
-and through him, in large measure, the rectitude of the system of 
justice. 
Discerning and articulating the elusive strains of ethical impera-
tives therefore seems a worthy task. And, accordingly, a special 
project of the American Bar Association (ABA) not long ago formu-
lated a number of canons, while a few commentators have contrib-
uted observations underscoring the importance of the ethical exercise 
of discretion by the powerful public prosecutor. But there is little 
danger that one more submission will overcrowd the field. 
Here, I shall discuss only three of the many ethical problems 
along the prosecutor's way: selective prosecution, prejudgment of 
credibility, and conflict of interest. While perhaps not the hardest 
questions, I think they are both important and perplexing. Also, 
they are united by a common element. In different ways, each con-
cerns the real or imagined impact of factors extraneous to the 
strictly legal assessment of a criminal case. And each has received 
the attention of the ABA project with less than completely gratifying 
results. 
!. SELECTIVE PROSECUTION AND DIFFERENTIAL JUSTICE 
At first encounter, the widely supported brief for uniformity 
in the enforcement of the criminal laws appears to need little argu-
mentation. To most, the proposition "Equal justice under law," 
• Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1951, Harvard University; LL.B. 
1953, Yale University. Assistant District Attorney, New York County, 1954-1968. Mem-
ber of the American Law Institute. Former member of the Executive Committee of the 
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chiseled on the courthouse pediment, is both elegant and self-evident. 
Indeed, this slogan expresses for many the quintessence of the 
American system of justice. Yet, the phrase is fundamentally decep-
tive. While wide or irrational disparities in treatment are deplorable, 
equality in the sense of uniformity in result is neither the fact nor 
the ideal in the system of justice. A given piece of human behavior, 
described grossly by statute as a crime, does not and should not 
generate an automatic and standardized response from police, juries, 
or judges. Nor should we expect an undiscriminated prosecutorial 
reflex. To some degree, justice requires regard for the differentiating 
characteristics of a particular crime or criminal. 
Differential justice flows from both necessity and option. Among 
necessities, I count the low resolving power of even the most re-
sourceful policemen. And of the relatively few offenders caught, 
evidentiary deficiencies require the release of many who are prob-
ably guilty. Then, too, in many jurisdictions swelling dockets 
exacerbate the disparity in result between the defendant who is 
convicted after trial and the one who tenders an expeditious guilty 
plea. 
Some of these realities of differential justice undoubtedly mark 
flaws in the system. But the essential defect is to be found, I think, 
not so much in the fact that some offenders go unwhipped-or less 
severely whipped-as in the wanton, almost random, manner in which 
the necessitated differentialities are bestowed. I perceive scant ther-
apy in the ministrations of the criminal law, and I cannot believe 
that its ineffectiveness can be assigned to insufficient use. Reduction, 
then, in the impunity ratio is not the principal objective; rather, 
we should try to shift the process of differentiation from blind neces-
sity to the intelligent exercise of discretionary option. From the 
decision to arrest through the choice of sentence, particular circum-
stances of the offense and individual characteristics of the offender 
should exert influence, as indeed they do when the opportunity oc-
curs. And we should accept the consequence of a reasonable disparity 
in result for superficially similar crim'es in the interest of the flexi-
bility inherent in justice. 
Among those entrusted with critical discretionary options in the 
American system of criminal justice, the public prosecutor occupies 
a pre-eminent place. Daily, the prosecutor decides whether to prose-
cute and selects the grade of criminality to which a defendant may 
offer his guilty plea ( contributing, perhaps, an important voice on 
the matter of punishment as well). More importantly, he is entrusted 
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with the decision whether and how persistently to investigate a per-
son or condition in the effort to make a criminal case. While these 
options are rarely his exclusively, he may be regarded as the central 
impetus in the state's resort to, and choice of, criminal sanctions. The 
decision is a virtually inescapable responsibility for the dutiful 
prosecutor. The police may bring him cases, other agencies may 
conduct investigations with criminal consequences, and the court 
or grand jury may be the arbiter of some of his decisions, but the 
prosecutor's impact on the course of the case is so great that it is 
fitting to tum to him to answer for the multiple discriminations 
in his ordinary exercise of options. 
To refine the ethical ingredient in the use of discretion, let us 
exclude from consideration those easy cases in which the prosecutor 
declines to prosecute the untenable case or proceeds with an arti-
ficially inflated one. We concern ourselves only with the case fit and 
scaled for legitimate prosecution, where its creation, pursuit, or aban-
donment is motivated by purposes extraneous to its legal merit. 
Professor Monroe H. Freedman, who gave us his candid, pro-
vocative, and unorthodox responses to "The Three Hardest Ques-
tions" confronting defense counsel,1 uses a blunter instrument to 
probe prosecutorial ethics.2 As deftly as he defended defense counsel, 
so roundly does he prosecute prosecutors. He facilitates his object 
by mainly addressing instances of clear and blatant misuse of power, 
such as overcharging to "coerce" a guilty plea, deliberately sup-
pressing proof or introducing false evidence, concealing police per-
jury, or retaliating with criminal charges against the civilian who 
complains of police abuse. However, he also attacks-with little 
supporting analysis-the prosector who singles out a target for deter-
mined prosecution. Citing Al Capone and James Hoffa as the victims 
of overzealous prosecution, he decries "prosecutions that are directed 
at individuals rather than at crimes." 
The ethical standard so casually suggested by Professor Freedman 
is somewhat baffling. What does he mean by a prosecution directed 
against an individual? Does he mean that in deciding where to inves-
tigate or how vigorously to prosecute, the district attorney should 
have no regard for the personal characteristics of the actual or poten-
tial defendant? Surely, he does not argue that in deciding on the 
1. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three 
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1469 (1966). 
2. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEo. 
L. REv. 1030 (1967). 
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acceptability of a lesser plea, the prosecutor should pay no heed to 
whether the offender is a novice or a seasoned professional, treating 
all cases alike according to the deed that was done. But if the prose-
cutor may ethically take the background or reputation of the defen-
dant into consideration in electing an appropriate disposition, why 
not in fixing his investigative sights? Would the ban on individuals 
as targets preclude the decision to devote prosecutorial energy to 
discovering evidence of a crime committed by a known underworld 
loanshark? Or would Professor Freedman only countenance a prose-
cution of such a target for usury, regardless of the evidence of other 
reprehensible conduct unearthed by the investigation? Why does 
Professor Freedman find it less honorable (as he seems to) for the 
prosecutor to select for his attention one of many violators of the 
same penal provision than to choose one of many different crimes 
for specially vigorous pursuit? Apparently, a prosecutor who cracked 
down relentlessly on gambling, pot-smoking, or prostitution (direct-
ing his attention to crimes, not individuals) need fear no censure 
from Professor Freedman, even though he did nothing about street 
muggings or corruption and was motivated solely by his own per-
sonal antipathy to vice. 
If the prosecutor may (as he must) rank his targets according to 
some system of priorities, the ethical problem would seem to inhere 
in the assumptions that determine the order. The most recent, 
authoritative, and exhaustive treatment of the proper discharge of 
the prosecution function is the ABA Standards Relating to The 
Prosecution Function and The Defense Function, compiled by a 
distinguished advisory committee, chaired during most of its working 
life by the man who became Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. Several 
of the standards speak to and around the discretionary options prop-
erly a part of the prosecutor's role. The most specific of these is 
standard 3.9, which reads as follows in the Approved Draft: 
3.9 Discretion in the charging decision. 
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute or 
cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows that the 
charges are not supported by probable cause. 
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the 
evidence might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances 
and for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to 
prosecute, notwithstanding that evidence may exist which would sup-
port a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may 
properly consider in exercising his discretion are: 
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(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact 
guilty; 
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense; 
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in rela-
tion to the particular offense or the offender; 
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant; 
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify; 
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or con-
viction of others; 
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another 
jurisdiction. 
(c) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give 
no weight to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages 
which might be involved or to a desire to enhance his record of con-
victions. 
(d) In cases which involve a serious threat to the community, the 
prosecutor should not be deterred from prosecution by the fact that 
in his jurisdiction juries have tended to acquit persons accused of the 
particular kind of criminal act in question. 
(e) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in 
number or degree than he can reasonably support with evidence at 
trial. 
The thrust of this formulation (as more fully expounded by the 
draftsmen in their commentary) is (I) "The prosecutor ordinarily 
should prosecute if after full investigation he finds that a crime has 
been committed, he can identify the perpetrator, and he has evidence 
which will support a verdict of guilty," and (2) "It is axiomatic that 
all crimes cannot be prosecuted even if this were desirable." The 
commentary proceeds to a forthright stand in favor of selective prose-
cution. The prosecutor is told that he "must adopt a first-things-first 
policy"; he is reassured that he is "not neglecting his public duty 
or discriminating among offenders" by eschewing "mechanical ap-
plication of the 'letter of the law' " in favor of a "flexible and 
individualized application of its norms." In view of this clear posi-
tion, we need not be troubled by a nasty persistence of apparent 
inconsistency when, in the same breath, the commentators recite 
several extra-evidentiary factors to guide prosecutorial selectivity, 
while advising prosecution of charges "warranted by the evidence." 
The text may be comfortably taken to say, simply, that a charge 
unwarranted by the evidence should never be lodged, but that an 
individualized selection may be made from among several charges 
of differing gravity, all of which are supported by evidence. Nor 
do the draftsmen rule out ethically refusing to prosecute altogether 
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a well-founded charge, despite some intimation to the contrary in 
the first proposition noted above. 
The plain purpose of standard 3.9, then, is to provide guidance 
to prosecutors in deciding whether and to what extent to prosecute 
a supportable charge. While some of the suggested factors are inter-
esting in themselves,3 and some omissions are odd,4 over all the for-
mulation stands as a satisfactory collation of mitigating elements 
which may move a conscientious prosecutor to block or ameliorate 
the full force of a penal law. 
Yet, the standards leave me with an uneasy feeling that the issue 
has not been squarely met. The reason for my disquiet, I think, is 
that the proponents of the standards embrace the principle of 
unequal justice (if they will forgive the use of that abrasive term) 
upon a consideration of only the easy side of the question: leniency 
and mitigation. Few, looking at the meritorious case in which the 
prosecutor has interposed a discretionary choice to spare the deserv-
ing offender the full harshness of the law's penalty, would call the 
result unjust. However, the standards leave two related questions to 
resolution largely by negative pregnant. 
First, are we to read the standards to require that the ethical 
prosecutor turn resolutely away from any contrary impulse and 
prosecute to the fullest extent any hapless soul who falls into his 
hands without sufficient mercy points? Are the cases, for example, in 
which the prosecutor agrees to a lesser plea to be regarded as excep-
tional, specially warranted deviations from his ethical duty to let the 
legislative will be done? Let us remember that the legislature, in de-
fining crimes and their degrees-with commensurate punishments-
necessarily conceived of aggravated instances, prescribing maximum 
sanctions suitable for the worst cases in the range embraced by the 
crime category. May not the prosecutor, like the judge, consider most 
cases to be less than the worst manifestations of the conduct described 
by law and recommend lenient or alternative treatment of the of-
fender accordingly? If so, what we need from those who would voice 
ethical criteria are standards that inform the prosecutor when he 
3. A notable example is "possible improper motives of a complainant." ABA 
STANDARDS § 3.9(b)(iv). 
4. For example, the text of standard 3.9 does not mention the offender's youth and 
clean background as a potential mitigating factor, although standard 3.S(a) recom-
mends that the "prosecutor should explore the availability of non-criminal disposition 
•.. especially in the case of a first offender." The comment expands on this alterna• 
tive. The commentary to standard 3.9(b), however, does state that "the offender's age, 
prior record [and] general background •.• require the prosecutor to view the whole 
range of possible charges . . . ." 
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should treat a case as unworthy of reduced penalty: In which in-
stances should the full fury of the law be expressed by the ethical 
prosecutor? Here, on the ugly side, we may expect to find the 
unjust effects of personal prejudice, anger, inappropriate moralism, 
and similar unhealthy extraneous considerations counterpointing 
those that might impel the prosecutor toward leniency. Properly 
drafted, then, the standard should imply no preference for either full 
or moderated prosecutions, but rather suggest the appropriate factors 
for consideration in making the choice. 
Second, the standards fail to address the question that worries 
Professor Freedman: When should the prosecutor pursue a selected 
target, seeking evidence for prosecution? Standard 3.l(a) simply states 
that the prosecutor "has an affirmative responsibility to investigate 
suspected illegal activity when it is not adequately dealt with by 
other agencies." Passing with wonder, but without comment, the 
implied deference to "other agencies" which the section's limitation 
imposes on the prosecutor, we discern no guidance for the exercise 
of this "affirmative responsibility." Perhaps it is enough for some 
jurisdictions to call upon the prosecutor to bend his investigative 
efforts to every case of suspected crime, regardless of the girth of the 
reed of suspicion or the nature of the crime or criminal to be pur-
sued. But for others, surely, the decision to investigate-that is, to 
undertake the long, arduous task of building a case when no clear 
evidence pokes through the surface-must, by necessity, be selective, 
and it requires one of the more significant exercises of discretion in 
the prosecutor's arsenal. Do the framers of the standards agree with 
Professor Freedman that it is unethical for the prosecutor to decide 
to investigate a person because he suspects that the person is engaged 
in one of a variety of criminal activities, and to seek to make a case 
against him for any crime he can support with evidence? Do the 
ethics of the choice dictate a prior resolve to investigate certain 
activity, qua activity, to catch whoever might be involved in it? If 
the framers feel-as I do-that the distinction between these two 
is an artificial one, unwarranted by any rational policy, then how 
should the prosecutor select his target, be it crime or criminal? 
Once the target is selected, it is not difficult for the honest district 
attorney to justify the chase. All criminal enterprises of any com-
plexity, and particularly the subterranean, are dangerous to the 
social ease of the community. So the prosecutor, relentlessly dogging 
the corrupt official or agency, the reputed mafia captain, or the 
burglary, or car-theft, or narcotics "ring," may readily defend his 
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decision to seek evidence for a prosecution. Little favor will be found 
by those voices which seek to brand the chase as "harassment" or 
"persecution" of citizens who have not yet given cause for arrest. 
True, the techniques of such prosecutorial investigation produce 
protest from some quarters; electronic surveillance, infiltration by 
spies and informers, and the patient compilation of "innocent" data 
are not favored police activities in a free society. But, at least when 
the quarry whom the responsible prosecutor is pursuing lacks politi-
cal charisma, the effort to catch him is commonly thought to be the 
commendable enterprise of a dynamic public official. Yet, the process 
of selection, the method by which the prosecutor decides to go after 
this target while letting that one escape his diligent efforts, must be 
a discretionary matter of some ethical consequence. 
As a matter of ethics, the problem sounds to me in tones of mo-
tivation. It is less important to me that a prosecutor spends his 
efforts bringing to bar a notorious pimp, while doing nothing to 
discover evidence of police corruption, than why this election was 
made. If a plea to the reduced crime of manslaughter is accepted 
by the prosecutor from a defendant who murdered a clerk during a 
holdup, while in another case the prosecutor offers no lesser plea 
to a man who kills a cop who interrupted a robbery, the important 
question is why the prosecutor insists on the full measure of guilt for 
the cop-killer and not for the clerk-killer. The ethical objective, it 
seems to me, is to keep the exercise of this important discretionary 
power of the prosecutor free of improper motivation. 
I recognize the significance of my disparagement of objective 
consequences. Unequal results are unequal regardless of the motiva-
tion of the official who achieved them. But if Robert Kennedy, as 
Attorney General, was convinced that the Teamsters Union, and 
Hoffa in particular, was destructive to trade unionism and a power-
ful, dangerous, and gangster-ridden force in the economy of the 
nation, would not his pursuit of Hoffa seem more ethical than if 
(as Freedman hypothesizes) Kennedy resolved to imprison Hoffa 
in revenge for a trivial personal insult and brought the armies of 
the Justice Department against him on that account? The prosecutor 
who senses the outrage of his constituency against the aggressive and 
unsightly hordes of prostitutes infesting the streets may ethically 
respond by stricter application of valid laws against prostitution. 
More questionable, it seems to me, is the same campaign waged by 
the prosecutor as self-appointed custodian of community morality, 
impelled by personal distaste generated by his own values. I do not 
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suggest that the honorable prosecutor be the slave of his electorate. 
Indeed, in many matters his duty clearly lies in the defiance of com-
munity pressures. But, within the confines of law, I would rather see 
his discretion guided by an honest effort to discern public needs and 
community concerns than by personal pique or moralistic imper-
tinence. 
It may be argued, with some merit, that my distinction is as 
artificial as Freedman's, and far less workable than the measured 
advice of the ABA standards. What prosecutor in his senses would 
admit to being motivated by personal pique? What action could 
not be rationalized as a good faith effort to discern community needs? 
And what possible scheme of enforcement of professional canons 
could hinge on the purity of official motivation? Once again, are 
we lawyers not acting the part of disingenuous moralists, teasing 
ourselves with chimeras of fancied rectitude? Perhaps; it is a charge 
with a familiar sting. Perhaps it is not enough to reply that the 
announcement of professional ethics is not, in the main, a practical 
endeavor. Perhaps it is unpersuasive to argue that unenforced, 
or unenforceable, ethical canons occupy a useful place in the system 
of law. 
Let us frankly acknowledge that justice in the criminal process 
and the rectitude of its administrators are both largely a matter of 
myth. (I use myth in the anthropological sense, as a community belief 
which, whether true or not, is necessary for the functioning of some 
institution of that community.) We need faith in our legal insti-
tutions, and it helps to define the nature of our expectations. 
Whether the precision and accuracy of that definition can contri-
bute to its realization is, of course, a matter of the most theoretical 
speculation. But is it not conceivable that by stating the nature of 
our demand with care we may encourage the institution to respond 
along the same beam? Essentially, then, I am neither seeking to 
conceal the weaknesses of the structure beneath a gloss of pious 
mythology, nor am I confident in the expectation that formulation 
produces compliance. Rather, I hope here only to describe what I 
believe to be the root of ethical comportment. And if it be said that 
prosecutors claim to be moved in the exercise of their discretion by 
public purposes only, then I am less concerned with detecting their 
deception than I am gratified to discover that the rationalization 
evidences adherence to the precept that public compassion, not 
private moralism, counts. 
It might be noted that paragraphs (c) and (d) of standard 3.9 ap-
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pear to hint at the motivational basis of ethical conduct, advising the 
prosecutor to disregard stray thoughts of his political future. Al-
though they are in what seems to me to be the correct vein, these 
ideas are nonetheless poorly framed. Paragraph (c) seems to say two 
quite different things at once: Contemplating the personal or political 
advantage of a sturdy conviction ratio, the conscientious prosecutor 
should neither (1) prosecute merely because he feels he has a sure 
winner, nor (2) decline to prosecute because he fears an adverse 
verdict. When the word "merely" is properly stressed, there can be 
little doubt of the wisdom of the first injunction. The second, how-
ever, is open to some question. Of course, when put as it is in para-
graph (c), it is easily swallowed; declining to prosecute a losing case 
is hardly commendable when done solely for the prosecutor's selfish 
advantage of a high conviction rate. But paragraph (d) (rather 
superfluously) amplifies the theme: At least in cases involving "seri-
ous threat to the community," the prosecutor should not be deterred 
by prior experience reflecting juror sentiment against prosecuting 
the act in question. While it may be hard to imagine a measurable 
tendency of jurors to acquit on such "serious" charges, the prosecutor 
who heeds such experience despite his personal outrage may be ac-
cording proper respect to community sentiment. The prosecutor, 
for example, may regard pornography or marihuana or public pro-
test as seriously threatening, but I suggest he would do well in the 
exercise of his discretion if he tempered his efforts in accord with 
the public sentiment-contrary to his own-which may be reflected 
in prior jury acquittals for crimes of those sorts. 
Thus, I think I would recast the substance of paragraphs (a), (b), 
(c), and (d) of standard 3.9 along the following lines: 
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to prosecute 
charges for which there is insufficient supporting legal evidence. 
(b) The prosecutor should affirmatively seek the evidence to sup-
port a prosecution where, in his judgment, the well-being of the com-
munity is seriously threatened by illegal enterprise or by the criminal 
activities of an identifiable person or persons, notwithstanding the 
fact that such crime or criminal has thus far escaped detection or 
arrest. 
(c) The prosecutor is obliged neither to seek evidence, nor to 
prosecute all charges supported by legal evidence, nor to prosecute 
such charges to the fullest extent allowed by the law. In deciding 
whether and to what extent to investigate or to prosecute such 
charges, the prosecutor, disregarding personal advantage or inclina-
tion, should consider 
May 1973] Prosecutorial Ethics 1155 
(i) prevailing community sentiment toward the offense in 
question; 
(ii) mitigating or aggravating circumstances of the criminal 
event; 
(iii) appropriate features of the defendant's background and 
criminal propensity; and 
(iv) the cooperation of the defendant in the apprehension or 
conviction of others for crimes of equal or greater gravity. 
II. PREJUDGING CREDIBILITY 
Our system of justice provides for a fact finder. A rather elaborate 
process has been devised to enhance the accuracy of that divining 
mechanism. Although far from infallible, it is still believed by 
many to be the best design yet conceived. And the prime function 
of that official fact finder, be it judge or jury, is to determine credi-
bility. To what extent should the prosecutor, in the performance of 
his proper role, assume a supervening truth-detecting responsibility? 
As with any good lawyer anticipating trial, the prosecutor should 
seek to learn the stories of as many witnesses as he can find. And 
when presented with inexact, incomplete, or conflicting accounts, as 
is commonly the case, I do not suppose he can be censured for 
encouraging witnesses to try to improve their memories and get 
their stories "straight." But, as every trial lawyer knows, obtaining a 
coherent account of a set of events is a long way from forming a 
personal judgment of the truth of the matter reported. Some defense 
counsel I know studiously avoid taking that large and difficult step 
to private judgment. They correctly feel no obligation to judge 
credibility. And they may feel their enthusiasm for their task would 
be dampened by a private assessment of the case. Assuming that, as 
an advocate, the prosecutor experiences a similar disinclination, is 
he impelled by the ethical commands of his special role to seek a 
personal evaluation of the truth? 
While ABA standard 3.9(a) condemns in its strongest terms the 
prosecutor who institutes or causes to be instituted criminal charges 
when he knows them to be unsupported by "probable cause," para-
graph (b)(i) of the same standard suggests that the prosecutor may 
decline to prosecute a case when he himself entertains a "reasonable 
doubt that the accused is in fact guilty." 
The matter is somewhat complicated by paragraph (e), which 
injects, subcutaneously, a third standard of certitude in the charging 
decision. On its surface, paragraph (e) instructs the prosecutor not to 
"bring or seek" charges greater in number or degree than he can 
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"reasonably support with evidence at the trial." The term "reason-
ably support" may occasion some mystification, which the commen-
tary seeks to explain. The paragraph, we are informed, is addressed 
exclusively to permissible multiplicity and gravity of charges at the 
point of accusation, providing the prosecutor's ethical escape from 
an imputation of harassment or the untoward acquisition of leverage 
for future plea negotiation. In this context, the commentary para-
phrases the provision: "hence, he [the prosecutor] may charge in 
accordance with what he then believes he can establish as a prima 
fade case." With this enlightenment, the rather awkwardly expressed 
phrase "can reasonably support with evidence at trial" may be read: 
"can reasonably expect that at the time of trial--despite evaporation, 
suppression, or other misfortune-he will be able to support with 
legally sufficient evidence." 
The standard of probable cause does not require exacting judg-
ment from the prosecutor, for it does not entail great certainty con-
cerning the underlying truth of the matter; "probable cause" may be 
predicated on hearsay, and, indeed, does not even import a substan-
tial likelihood of guilt. Like probable cause, the prima fade standard 
takes little account of credibility questions, but it is a significantly 
more demanding criterion, satisfied only by (1) "legal" (i.e., admis-
sible) evidence (2) sufficiently complete to establish every element of 
the crime in question, credence aside. So the standard countenances 
accusation on no greater certitude than the belief warranting arrest 
(probable cause), but the prosecutor should not "overcharge," that 
is, he should not accuse of more than he reasonably anticipates he 
will be able to support with legally sufficient evidence. Read to-
gether, then, the trio of provisions sounds like this: The prosecutor 
must abjure prosecution without probable cause, should refuse to 
charge without a durable prima fade case, and may decline to pro-
ceed if the evidence fails to satisfy him beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The interesting part of the standard is the suggestion that if the 
prosecutor, imagining himself in the seat of a juror, would not vote 
for a verdict of guilty, he may decline to present the matter to the 
system's designated fact finder. I have heard prosecutors, as a matter 
of personal conscience, take this notion as an ethical imperative. "I 
never try a defendant," so runs the credo, "unless I am personally 
convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Or, for some: 
"beyond any doubt." Realistically, the prosecutor figures that, in-
flamed by the brutal facts of the crime or for some other reason, the 
jury may overlook the basis for the doubt which nags his own judg-
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ment. And he could not sleep at night having contributed to the 
conviction of a man who might just possibly be innocent. Of course, 
in reaching this extra-judicial judgment, the prosecutor will allow 
himself to consider relevant items which might be excluded from 
trial evidence. Nor would his refusal to prosecute the case necessarily 
mean he would decline to recommend the acceptance of a guilty plea, 
for the confession which normally accompanies the plea may remove 
the prosecutor's doubt. 
Yet withal, the prosecutor's conscientious stand represents a not-
able modification of our system of determining truth and adjudi-
cating guilt. At the least it creates a new subtrial, informal and often 
ex parte, interposed between the determinations of the accusing and 
judging authorities. 
Can there be any objection to the prosecutor's transformation of 
the standard's "may" into a personal "must"? A defendant, of course, 
can only benefit from this additional safety procedure, and its adop-
tion may move the prosecutor to more diligent and painstaking 
pretrial investigation, including an open-minded search for per-
suasive defense evidence. This latter effort comports nicely with the 
familiar injunction duly intoned by standard l.l(c): "The duty of the 
prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict." From these 
features it may appear that the standards should have placed this 
burden of internal persuasion on the prosecutor in every case. I 
think not. 
A concrete, commonplace example may illustrate the operation 
of the precept and flesh out our appraisal of its wisdom. Practitioners 
know too well a sticky item: the one-eye-witness-identification case. 
For instance, an elderly white person is suddenly grabbed from be-
hind in a dimly lit vestibule by a black youth who shows a knife and 
takes the victim's wallet. The entire incident occupies thirty seconds. 
Some days later, the victim spots the defendant in the neighborhood 
and has him arrested by the nearest policeman. Although the 
prosecutor presses him hard, the victim swears he has picked the 
right man. There is nothing unusual about the defendant's appear-
ance, the victim never saw him before the crime, and he admits he 
does not know many Negroes personally, but his certainty cannot 
be shaken. He insists that in those few moments of terror his at-
tacker's face was "indelibly engraved on his memory." The defendant 
may have an alibi: his mother will testify that at the time of the crime 
he was at home watching television with her (not evidence readily 
credited). And that is the entire case. 
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Many prosecutors, I think, would concede that as jurors they 
would hestitate to vote "guilty" on this evidence. His sincerity unmis-
takable, the victim might well be correct in his identification of the 
defendant; perhaps it is more likely than not that the defendant is 
the perpetrator. And juries regularly convict in such cases. But since 
he knows the fallibility of identification under such circumstances, 
the basis for reasonable doubt is clear to the prosecutor. 
Should the ethical prosecutor refuse to put this sort of evidence 
before the jury, withhold from the regular fact-finding process the 
opportunity to decide the issue? Indeed, should the conscientious 
prosecutor set himself the arduous task of deciding whether in 
this instance the complainant is right? If it is his duty to do so, 
how does he rationally reach a conclusion? For this purpose, are 
his mental processes superior to the jurors' or the judge's? Or may he 
-should he-abstain from prejudging the case and simply pass the 
responsibility to those who cannot escape it? 
Let us take the problem in a somewhat different, equally com-
mon form. The defendant, let us assume, is charged with the illegal 
possession of a quantity of narcotics. There is little doubt of his 
guilt; indeed, he is ready to plead guilty. However, he claims that 
the drug was obtained by an illegal search of his automobile and 
should therefore be suppressed. The police officer insists that he 
retrieved the bag of drugs after the defendant abandoned it by throw-
ing it from the window of the vehicle at the officer's approach. Now, 
the prosecutor knows that some drug carriers do try to divest them-
selves of the contraband when approached by police, but he also 
knows that many police seek to escape the strictures of the ex-
clusionary rule by reciting an abandonment to cover an illegal search 
and seizure. 5 Despite his general suspicion, however, the prosecutor 
has no reason to believe that the case in question is based on false 
testimony. Moreover, he has every reason to believe that on the 
ultimate issue of the defendant's guilt, justice will be done. ·what 
is his ethical course? 
I confess I have no clear release from the prosecutor's predica-
ment. I recognize as laudable the taking of one more precaution to 
avert the horror of convicting an innocent person. Yet, on balance, I 
5. In fact, prosecutors have become so concerned about this variety of police 
perjury that the New York County District Attorney recently joined with defense 
counsel in an unsuccessful attempt to have the New York court of appeals shift the 
burden of proof to the state when abandonment is asserted in reply to a motion to sup-
press contraband drugs. People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 270 N.E.2d 709, 321 N.Y.S.2d 
884 (1971). 
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do not believe the prosecutor must-or should-decide to proceed 
only in those cases where he, as a fact finder, would resolve the issue 
for the prosecution. 
Where the prosecutor, from all he knows of the case, believes that 
there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant is innocent of 
the charge, he should, of course, not prosecute. Similarly, if he has 
good reason to believe that a witness is lying about a material fact, 
he should not put the witness on the stand, and if his case falls 
without the witness' testimony he should dismiss it regardless of 
whether inadmissible evidence persuades him of the culpability of the 
defendant. Short of these grounds for declining prosecution on the 
merits, I deem the ethical obligations of the prosecutor satisfied if 
he makes known to the court, or the defense, discovered adverse 
evidence and defects of credibility in witnesses. 
Thus, when the issue stands in equipoise in his own mind, when 
he is honestly unable to judge where the truth of the matter lies, I 
see no flaw in the conduct of the prosecutor who fairly lays the 
matter before the judge or jury. He need not vouch for his cause 
implicitly, as he may not explicitly. Nor should he lose sleep over his 
reliance upon the device that the system has constructed for the task 
of truth-seeking, inexact though he knows it to be. Although the 
prosecutor's discretionary powers may be important, and his detached 
and honorable presence vital, he is not, after all, the sole repository 
of justice. Thus, I do not believe that the system is served by canons 
which overplay the prosecutor's "quasi-judicial" role. He is, let us 
remember, an advocate as well as a minister of public justice, and the 
due discharge of his many obligations of fair and detached judgment 
should not inhibit his participation in what is, for better or worse, 
essentially a dialectic process. In our well-guided efforts to imbue 
the system with flexibility and personal qualities of sympathy, we 
need not sacrifice the values which may yet inhere in the design of 
controlled contention. 
Ill. CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
To say that the prosecutor need have no compunction in resort-
ing to adversary methods of fact finding is not to define his role as 
purely barristerial. On this side of the Atlantic, at least, the prosecu-
tor operates within a public responsibility transcending the ad-
versarial considerations of any particular case. His power is con-
siderable, his obligations general, and we therefore demand of him 
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-as we do of other flag-bedecked authorities-a strong conscience 
and a hand free of the possible influence of extraneous and inap-
propriate loyalties. The moral injunction against conflicting interests 
is founded on a well-warranted mistrust of ministers and a sound ap-
preciation of the inaccessibility of the many inchoate factors shaping 
the decisions of the powerful. Rather than examining his overt con-
duct or inaction, we demand that our only-human servant eschew 
temptation. 
The identification and articulation of those lures which, in fact 
or in appearance, imperil duty is a challenge to the most resourceful 
draftsman. Of the several formulations directly or indirectly instruct-
ing the prosecutor in the ethical imperatives of his calling, none (to 
my mind) has come close to dealing clearly or comprehensively with 
the problem of conflicting interests. The Approved Draft of the ABA 
Standards Relating to The Prosecution Function, published in March 
of 1971, contains a supplement recommending some alterations in 
the formulations previously promulgated in tentative form. In the 
main, the proposed amendments take account of a sister study pub-
lished in the interim-the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. 
Standard 1.2 of the Tentative Draft of the Standards Relating to 
The Prosecution Function spelled out some examples of the appear-
ance or reality of a conflict of interest. The Approved Draft supple-
ment, however, deletes this short list because, as the commentary 
explains: "it carries the misleading implication that it is exhaustive. 
It may appropriately be regarded, instead, as commentary." In place 
of the omitted specifications, standard l.2(a) now incorporates by 
reference unspecified definitions of "unprofessional conduct" (a 
term signifying conduct subject to discipline) in the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. Unfortunately, however, not much of direct 
bearing can be found in the Code, for these canons are mainly ad-
dressed to the private practitioner and speak almost exclusively in 
terms of duty to "client." There may be some who insist that there 
is a single body of ethical precepts binding the bar in general, its 
public as well as its private sectors. Yet, there is little to be gleaned 
from this Code of the peculiar responsibilities of the prosecutor and 
his particular temptations. The peculiar nature of the prosecutor's 
ethical constraint stems from the power in his hands, rather than 
from obligations of fealty to the interests of a client. Since this plen-
tiful well of official corruption passes virtually unnoticed by the 
Code, we must continue to look for advice in the Tentative Draft of 
the Standards Relating to The Prosecution Function, even though 
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the ABA's initial recommendations have now been demoted to mere 
commentary. 
The meagre effort of the Tentative Draft ignores a species of 
conflict of interest sufficiently toxic to be cited in the Code relating 
to private practitioners: the implied conflict arising from a pecuniary 
stake in the outcome. Contingent enrichment also offends our no-
tions of decency when it appears among the robed participants in 
the process. Heavily contributing to the rejection of a recent judicial 
candidate was his broker's purchase of a negligible quantity of stock 
in a corporation whose fortunes might have been affected by a case 
in litigation before the judge in question. So, too, the prosecutor may 
be expected to shun financial interests which might be affected by 
matters within his office. Perhaps, little of the local prosecutor's work 
alters the financial condition of any enterprise in which he is likely 
to own a share. Yet, it is surely well to advise prosecutors to avoid 
investment (for example) in taverns or construction and maintenance 
firms contracting with the local government, for we would not want 
his investigative or prosecutorial ardor cooled by the prospect of 
financial loss. 
But let us not fall into the sweet naivete of the economists' 
uncluttered view of human motivation. Man is not moved by bread 
alone. Is not the ideal of personal detachment from the cause as 
seriously jeopardized by the prosecutor's relationship, friendship, 
or prior association with victim, witness, defendant, or adverse coun-
sel? The litigating bar of most communities is small and frequently 
friendly. The prosecutor (particularly if well chosen) is likely to be 
associated professionally or socially with some of the others in the 
group. The bar prides itself that friends can be diligent adver-
saries. But now one of the friendly combatants is a public official 
besides. Should we be concerned that his duty may conflict with the 
interests of friendship or the residue of prior association? 
Looking again to the ABA standards, faute de mieux we must 
rely on the Tentative Draft. Standard l.2(a)(b)(i) of the Standards 
Relating to The Prosecution Function warns the prosecutor to avoid 
the appearance or reality of a conflict of interest which may arise 
when "a law partner or other Ia-wyer professionally associated with 
the prosecutor or a relative appears as, or of, counsel for a defen-
dant." In such a case, the commentary counsels, the prosecutor 
should go so far as to recuse himself and make arrangements to be 
supplanted by another lawyer in accordance with the principles of 
standard 2.10, which calls for procedures for the supersession and 
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substitution of prosecutors upon "a public finding that this is re-
quired for the protection of the public interest." This means, one 
supposes, that when the prosecutor's cousin Max files a notice of 
appearance for the young man accused of joyriding, the prosecutor 
should appeal to the governor to find that his continued conduct of 
the prosecution would be inconsistent with the public interest. The 
suggestion takes the conscientious prosecutor a fair distance to claim 
the spotless mantle of Caesar's spouse. Then, too, consider the sus-
pected criminal relentlessly pursued by the energetic young prosecu-
tor through arduous investigation. What easier way to get the hot 
breath of the law off his neck than to retain cousin Max (who is, of 
course, under no ethical obligation to refuse the handsome fee 
tendered). Substituted counsel for the state may have less determina-
tion and certainly less experience in the matter. 
Standard l.2(b)(ii) of the ABA Tentative Draft also sees the de-
bilitating conflict arising when "a business partner or associate or a 
relative has any interest in a criminal case, either as a complaining 
witness, a party or as counsel." Passing the reiterated ban on the ap 
pearance of cousin Max for the defense, this curious provision might 
be thought to augment a ban upon pecuniary interest held by the 
prosecutor himself, but for the omission of any such reference in the 
standards. In essence, the provision advises withdrawal of the prose-
cutor when either an associate in some business enterprise or a rela-
tive of the prosecutor is the victim, the defendant, or a lawyer in a 
criminal prosecution. The emotional ties of commercial or blood 
relationship presumably disqualify the prosecutor for his official role. 
I suppose a prosecutor need hardly be told that it is unseemly for 
him to prosecute his mother or to try the man who raped his daugh-
ter. But one might wonder whether he is similarly disabled when 
the lawyer with whom he owns real estate appears to defend a client 
in a matter wholly unrelated to their joint property interest.6 
The final example of a conflict of interest cited in standard 1.2 
occurs when "a former client or associate is a defendant in a criminal 
case." This formulation is the sole allusion to the threat of the per-
sistence of previous ties. And it is deemed perceptible only when the 
bond runs to a defendant. Clearly, the prosecutor should not prose-
cute a former client on a new charge. Whether or not their prior 
confidential relationship accorded the prosecutor knowledge of the 
defendant's activities, few would doubt the impropriety of a person's 
6. To quibble, one might also question whether an attorney for a criminal de-
fendant has an "interest" in the case in the same sense as a "party" or victim. 
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former counsel appearing in the role of his present prosecutor. For 
somewhat different reasons, it is equally clear that the prosecutor 
should not control the case against a former associate, whether the 
nature of the association was commercial or legal (the distinction 
being mysteriously dropped in this clause). The difficulty of enumer-
ating types of terminated associations (e.g., teammates on a college 
varsity squad, fraternity brothers) is obvious, but it might be asked 
why disqualification arises only when the former associate appears 
in the role of defendant. If emotional ties disqualify the prosecutor 
when his present partner appears as the complaining witness in a 
street crime, can it be said that such bonds were severed when their 
business or legal unit was dissolved? 
Another oddity is apparent when the entire provision is read in 
conjunction with standard 2.3(b), which calls for the prosecutor to 
function as a full-time official. Obedience to this wise directive would 
obviate the major portion of the conflict of interest section, for the 
full-time prosecutor has neither law partners nor business associates. 
The prosecutor, obedient to the standards as a whole, need recuse 
himself only when a relative is involved as a witness, "party," or de-
fense counsel, or when a former client or associate is a defendant. 
In all, the provision seems ill conceived and awkwardly drawn. 
Concededly, a hard choice must be made in framing ethical standards. 
The formulation must be either broad and open, in which case it is 
indefinite and difficult to enforce, or it must be detailed and specific, 
in which case it is long but rarely complete. But however the choice 
is made, the language should address the essence of the conduct regu-
lated. Here, the draftsmen initially chose the approach of specific 
enumeration. Yet it is clear that they failed to describe the virus 
against which they sought to immunize. Thus, they have at the same 
time covered too much and too little, requiring recusation on trivial 
and illusory conflicts, while omitting many serious dangers to the 
prosecutor's impartiality. The latter flaw, at least, they subsequently 
recognized-but failed to cure. Even in the limited area of personal 
associations and relationships with described categories of individuals 
who enter the process in various capacities the standard falters. It fails 
to offer guidance over the range of potentially troublesome conflicts 
which may confront the prosecutor striving for an ethically upstand-
ing posture. 
Here (for illustrative purposes) I boldly submit another alterna-
tive formulation: 
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Art. X: Conflict of Interest 
X.l. It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to participate 
personally in any phase of a criminal investigation or prosecu-
tion in which he knows or reasonably anticipates that a member 
of his immediate family is or will be 
(a) the defendant, 
(b) the victim, 
(c) a witness, 
(d) counsel for the defendant, 
(e) counsel for any witness or interested party, or 
(f) the judge. 
X.2. It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to participate per-
sonally in any phase of a criminal investigation or prosecution 
unless he reasonably believes that his judgment will be en-
tirely unaffected by 
(a) any financial or pecuniary interest held by the prosecu-
tor or by any member of his immediate family in any 
business or enterprise which he reasonably believes 
might be involved in or materially affected by the case 
in question; 
(b) any consanguinal, marital, professional, or commer-
cial association, past or present, with any person who is 
or might reasonably become involved in the case in any 
capacity; or 
(c) any obligation to or association with any person or or-
ganization which has had or may have any material in-
fluence upon the course of his professional career and 
which is involved in or materially affected by the case in 
question. 
X.3. The prosecutor should decline to participate personally in, or 
if appropriate, should request the appointment of an inde-
pendent special prosecutor to relieve him of responsibility for 
the prosecution of 
(a) any matter in which he believes that, for any articulable 
reason, he would be unable to maintain proper profes-
sional detachment; or 
(b) any matter in which the public is likely to believe that 
the prosecutor labors under conflicting interests, obliga-
tions, or sentiments which would impair his proper pro-
fessional detachment. 
The first of my provisions (X.I) is the simplest. It subjects to pro-
fessional discipline any prosecutor who takes a personal part in a 
case in which a close relative is involved in any capacity. "\Vhere 
parents, offspring, spouse, or siblings are players, the prosecutor must 
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have no part in the affair. This is not to say, of course, that a prosecu-
tor may not ably try a case witnessed by his spouse. But who can 
doubt the public discomfort occasioned by the spectacle of the prose-
cutor enmeshed in public litigation with, against, or before a member 
of his immediate family. Indeed, such is the real as well as apparent 
danger to detachment that it might well be argued that shifting re-
sponsibility for prosecution to a colleague or subordinate does not 
rinse away the conflict. Yet, I hesitate to command the prosecutor 
to summon special counsel, unaffiliated with his office, in every in-
stance of this kind. I would prefer to advise the appointment of a 
special prosecutor only in those cases specified in the last of my pro-
posals (X.3). Likewise, I utilize a somewhat different test in the case 
of relatives more distant than members of the prosecutor's immediate 
family. 
A variety of interests, relationships, and obligations might affect 
the judgment of a prosecutor and cause him to distort the attention 
appropriate to the merits of a given matter. Because of their diversity 
and uncertain effects, I deem it impossible to enumerate these factors 
in a rule calling for automatic disassociation of the prosecutor. Yet, 
they can, I think, be described with comprehensible particularity in 
three categories, as attempted in my second provision (X.2). Here 
appear the pecuniary interests (overlooked by the ABA standards), 
together with the personal loyalties which might interfere with of-
ficial disinterest. Nor can I ignore that common source of influence 
which may be the most pernicious of all: political ambition. But in 
this area, it seems to me, the prosecutor should be enjoined from 
participation only when he reasonably believes that the interest or 
association may distract him. The aggressive and dedicated prosecu-
tor, resolved to conduct a vigorous prosecution of a leader in the 
political apparatus that elected him, should not be discouraged from 
participation in the case. So, too, there should be no automatic dis-
qualification of the prosecutor who wishes to pursue a case against 
a corporation in which his brother owns stock. Similarly, the prosecu-
tor who, in good faith, would dismiss a charge against a defendant 
represented by his former law partner, should not be deterred from 
his proper decision. 
In section X.2 the self-appraisal by the prosecutor of the potential 
conflict is not entirely subjective. That is, the prosecutor who feels 
himself free of conflicting considerations must justify that feeling 
by an objective criterion of reasonableness. The question becomes, 
could a prosecutor with an attachment of this particular sort reason-
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ably be deemed free in using his professional judgment? I do purport, 
here, to consider actual freedom of judgment, rather than the pos-
sible public imputation of fettered will. Yet, where such public dis-
approval is reasonable, it should coincide with the standard utilized. 
And where unreasonable, I simply choose to ignore it for the mo-
ment, to be regarded again further on in section X.3(b ). 
My final provision (X.3) is exhortative, advising either personal 
abstension, or, where appropriate, the drastic remedy (recklessly 
relied upon in all conflicts by the ABA standards) of calling for a 
specially appointed replacement in any case where, reasonably or 
not, the prosecutor feels his detachment disabled. A similar exhorta-
tion is tendered where the prosecutor has grounds for anticipating 
a public belief (justified or not) that the prosecutor is ensnared by 
a debilitating conflict. It can only be hoped that a prosecutor, threat-
ened by a loss of public confidence and sensitive to his political in-
terests, will respond to this advice by electing the option of dis-
association. 
Appended to my hasty draft must be a candid acknowledgment of 
the obvious: formulae have their painful limitations. I do not for a 
moment suppose that my short treatise can teach prosecutors to 
thread their way, above suspicion, among the reaching thorns of 
emotional predisposition. A complaining friend or editorial writer 
can affect the judgment of a prosecutor pondering the way of justice 
in a drug case, introducing a conflict of interest as real and potent as 
the appearance of his Aunt Martha as the victim in a burglary. Even 
the most respectable official purpose (e.g., to "clean up this town") 
may conflict with his professional appraisal of a prostitution arrest. 
No prosecutor is free of influences. His judgment of a case, his deci-
sion whether or how vigorously to prosecute a particular case, is 
necessarily compounded of many factors other than the cold legal 
assessment of its merits. And we expect predisposition on his part. 
We cannot (and perhaps should not) attempt to instruct him in the 
avoidance of all such claims on his judgment. Nor can we hope that 
a manual of avoidances, no matter how explicit or extensive, can 
entirely dispel public suspicion, for the public distrust of officials 
is, in large part, undifferentiated and deeply set. 
Yet, if we are going to ask our prosecutors to assume a noble and 
upstanding position in the judicial process, I suppose we must make 
the most refined gesture possible to inform them and their constit-
uents wherein we deem the prosecutor threatened by unacceptable 
erosion of his dispassion. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
1167 
Our system for the processing of criminal cases cannot fairly be 
faulted for its failure to reduce the incidence of criminal behavior. 
But the general disillusionment with the criminal process, from the 
outside and from within, is a matter for considerable regret. For, 
inter alia, we do count upon this system, awkward as it may be, to 
gratify our need to believe that our government is capable of play-
ing a creditable part in the drama of justice. The myth of legal 
competence serves our faith in orderly existence, and to the extent 
that the criminal process has become a clumsy spectacle bitterness 
and cynicism, infecting players as well as public, become as serious a 
threat to the system as the original causes of its distress. 
The prosecutor stands center stage in the process. His role is 
complex. He seeks the assurance of a sense of dignity in his part. He 
needs to feel that his role is not mere empty posturing in an ancient 
morality play that has long since lost its impact and pace. Among 
the sources of dignity, he discovers the maintenance of an upright 
presence in his mantle of office. At least, he can temper zeal with 
integrity. Thus the matter of official and professional responsibility-
ethics-becomes a concern of special importance to the prosecutor. 
And, of course, we share his desire to play a worthy part in the 
process, whatever may be its other woes. 
In the endeavor to describe the upright conduct required of a 
prosecutor, a major project has recently been completed by a pres-
tigious committee of the ABA. Considering three major ethical 
problems, however, I find but scant aid in the formulations of that 
effort. Indeed, in none of the areas considered here am I confident 
that the articulated standards confront the real dilemmas. 
Dimly, I perceive a mind neither tempted nor distracted from the 
appropriate guides to the proper employment of his considerable 
discretionary powers to be crucial to the prosecutor's proper stance. 
I am unable to formulate or rank the recommended considerations 
for his aid and our reassurance. However, we can try to warn him 
against the dangers to his freedom of choice and to announce wherein 
his detachment might become publicly suspect. He should shun cases 
in which his loyalties may be, or may be thought to be, divided be-
tween duty and personal affection or advantage. In regarding factors 
extraneous to the merits of a particular case, moreover, he should be 
wary of the effect on his judgment of personal prejudice and should 
endeavor, instead, to discern the dictates of public concern. And, 
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finally, while his ministerial obligations to protect the innocent 
against unjust conviction require the prosecutor to sift and evaluate 
evidence, I do not recommend that he regard himself as the sole 
arbiter of truth and justice. He does, after all, fulfill a role as advocate 
in a dialectic system for the divination of truth. Flawed though that 
system may be, the conscientious prosecutor need have no scruples 
to don his barrister's hat and take a doubtful matter to court. 
But perhaps we lawyers are overly concerned with the punctilious 
definition of misconduct, exaggerating our need for the false com-
fort of a neat code of honor and rectitude. After all, chivalry, as even 
Don Quixote eventually learned, is no panacea. 
